Abstract-As a quantitative criterion for privacy of "mechanisms" in the form of data-generating processes, the concept of differential privacy was first proposed in computer science and has later been applied to linear dynamical systems. However, differential privacy has not been studied in depth together with other properties of dynamical systems, and it has not been fully utilized for controller design. In this paper, first we clarify that a classical concept in systems and control, input observability (sometimes referred to as left invertibility) has a strong connection with differential privacy. In particular, we extend the concept of the Gramian to input observability and then show that differential privacy evaluates the maximum eigenvalue of the input observability Gramian. Next, enabled by our new insight into differential privacy, we develop a method to design dynamic controllers for a tracking problem while making the output information of the controlled plant differential private. We call the designed controller as such the differentially private controller. The usage of such controllers is further illustrated by solving a diabetes control problem where privacy issues are of concern.
I. INTRODUCTION
Along with the rapid development of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) and cloud computing technologies, privacy and security are becoming social issues, see e.g. [1] - [6] . When smart meters record households' electricity consumption patterns, or medical devices monitor users' health conditions, the collected data are usually processed statistically before being used in different applications to protect the privacy of data sources. However, even if one only publishes statistical analytics, not raw data, there is still possibility that personal information can be identified. Motivated by threats on privacy, several techniques aiming at protecting personal or sensitive information have been developed in information theory and computer science, such as the K-anonymity [7] and differential privacy [8] , [9] .
In practical applications, instead of being discussed as an issue for static data sets, privacy in fact needs to be treated as a critical property for dynamical systems; for example, individual's electricity consumption patterns and health conditions are captured by dynamical data evolving with time. More specifically, in a smart grid enabled by a real-time pricing mechanism, power companies may set electricity prices at each time based on the difference between the current consumer {y.kawano, m.cao}@rug.nl demands and the available power generations. Then, based on the offered prices, each user may choose to turn on or off some of their appliances. In this context, the considered dynamics are the power consumption-supply dynamics dictated by the pricing mechanisms. When taking the power companies as the plant, its input is then the aggregated electricity consumptions of all users while each user's consumption needs to be treated as a piece of private dynamic information related to personal life style; its output is the offered real-time price that is a piece of public dynamic information. Note that smart grid is one of many developing examples and we will illustrate our results in Section III using a diabetes treatment system from another big domains with privacy concerns, the healthcare industry.
In order to address privacy issues of datasets generated by dynamical systems, the concept of differential privacy has been applied to discrete-time linear dynamical systems, see e.g. [10] , [11] . In this paper, we further proceed with differential privacy analysis for the same class of systems. The main idea of differential privacy is to add noise to the output data before publishing them in order to avoid the situation when the private input data are identified, and differential privacy gives a measure of the privacy level. In other words, noise is designed and added to the output in order to achieve the prescribed differential privacy level of the dynamical system.
We continue this line of research taking two major steps: studying differential privacy in terms of input observability and then providing a private controller design method based on differential privacy. The differential privacy level of the discrete-time linear system can be interpreted as a quantitative criterion for the difficulty of estimating its input. In systems and control, the property for uniquely determining the input from the output is called input observability [12] or left invertibility [13] . For input observability, there are already several qualitative criteria, e.g. the rank condition of the transfer function matrix, the PBH type test [12] , [14] , and Kalman's rank type conditions [13] , [15] . However, these existing conditions do not provide quantitative analysis. Therefore, there is a gap between the relatively new concept of differential privacy and the classical concept of input observability in systems and control. In order to establish a bridge between differential privacy and input observability, we extend the concept of the Gramian to input observability. Then, we show that differential privacy evaluates the maximum eigenvalue of the input observability Gramian. In other words, small noise is enough to make the less input observable system highly differentially private. This new insight suggests that the input observability Gramian can be used for detailed privacy analysis as the standard controllability and observability Gramians do for detailed controllability and observability analysis.
Next, we apply differential privacy for dynamic tracking controller design to obtain a class of differentially private controllers. In the aforementioned smart grid example, the real-time pricing mechanism can be viewed as a controller, and correspondingly the input to the controller (household electricity consumptions) is needed to be protected from the published output of the controller (electricity prices). Our goal for the controller design is to achieve trajectory tracking protecting the privacy of the input to the controller. Trajectory tracking itself has been studied as a part of the output regulation problem, and there are complete characterizations for both static state and dynamic output feedback [16] . From the privacy preserving viewpoint, it is better to use less information of the plant, and therefore we employ the dynamic output feedback controller, which contains design parameters. In order to make the controller highly differentially private through small noise, one can choose controller parameters such that its H ∞ -norm becomes small because as we show, the maximum eigenvalue of the input observability Gramian is bounded by the H ∞ -norm for asymptotically stable systems. We provide a dynamic controller design method for solving the tracking problem and minimizing the H ∞ -norm simultaneously based on an LMI. It is worth pointing out that in order to increase the differential privacy level of the controller, one needs to make the H ∞ -norm of the controller small or add large noise. Both of them can deteriorate the control performance, and therefore differentially private controller design reduces to a trade-off between the privacy level and control performance.
In the context of the design of differentially private controllers we just formulated, there are related works. Differential privacy has been employed for private filtering design [10] , [11] , but not for controller design. The paper [10] also studies the connection between differential privacy and the H ∞ -norm of the system; however, differential privacy has not been studied from the input observability perspective, which was considered in our preliminary conference version [17] . Different from [10] , [17] , we consider not just i.i.d. noise, which may seem a slight technical extension, but we show that one can always achieve the same differential privacy level using systems' non-i.i.d. output noise and input noise, where the differential privacy analysis with input noise has not been well studied before due to some technical difficulties to be explained later. On the other hand, differential privacy has been used for LQ control [18] and distributed optimization [19] - [22] , where the controller gains or dynamics are designed without taking into account the privacy issues, and then noise is added to the designed controller. In contrast, we design the controller itself to make the system highly private by adding small noise.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the concept of differential privacy and analyzes it from several aspects including input observability. Section III provides a differentially private controller design method. Our method is illustrated by an example of diabetes control. Section IV briefly mentions extensions of our results to discrete-time nonlinear systems, where a part of the results has been presented in a preliminary conference version [23] . Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
Notations: The set of real numbers, positive numbers, and positive integers are denoted by R, R + and Z + , respectively. For vectors x 1 , . . . , x m ∈ R n , a collective vector
T ∈ R nm is also described by [x 1 ; · · · ; x m ] for the sake of simplicity of description. For sequence u(t) ∈ R m , t ∈ Z + , a collective vector consisting of its subsequence is denoted by U t (τ ) := [u(τ ); · · · ; u(τ + t)] ∈ R (t+1)m by using a capital alphabet. When τ = 0, the argument is omitted, i.e., U t := [u(0); · · · ; u(t)]. For vector x ∈ R n and p ∈ Z + , its norms is denoted by |x| p := (
Also, its wighted norm is denoted by |x| A := (x T Ax) 1/2 , where A ∈ R n×n is a symmetric and positive definite matrix. For a square matrix A ∈ R n×n , its determinant is denoted by det(A). Also, its maximum and minimum eigenvalues are denoted by λ max (A) and λ min (A), respectively. The identity matrix of size n is denoted by I n . A continuous function α : [0, a) → R + is said to be of class K if it is strictly increasing and α(0) = 0. Moreover, it is said to be of class K ∞ if a = ∞ and α(r) → ∞ as r → ∞.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY ANALYSIS
We start with differential privacy analysis of a "mechanism" induced by a discrete-time linear system with noise; the exact definition of a mechanism will become clear later. As typically studied in differential privacy [8] , [9] , we focus on a finite sequence of data, i.e., properties in finite time, and consider a less private scenario where one can obtain the following system model, especially its (A, B, C, D) matrices:
for t ∈ Z + , where x(t) ∈ R n , u(t) ∈ R m and y(t) ∈ R q denote the state, input and output, respectively, and
The main idea of differential privacy is to add noise w to output data y before publishing them in order to prevent input data from being determined from published output data y + w when the system model is known. In other words, noise is designed to make a mechanism private with the desired privacy level, and differential privacy gives a criterion for the privacy level.
In this section, we study differential privacy from three aspects for linear dynamical systems. First, we study differential privacy of the mechanism with output noise. Second, we investigate differential privacy of the mechanism in terms of the observability of the discrete-time linear systems because from the systems and control viewpoint, determining input data from the published output data can be viewed as an observability problem. Finally, we analyze differential privacy of the mechanism with input noise. In fact, under several technical assumptions, one can conclude that adding noise to the output channel and input channel generate essentially equivalent differentially private mechanisms.
A. Differential Privacy With Output Noise
By using the system dynamics (1), the output sequence Y t ∈ R (t+1)q can be described as
where O t ∈ R (t+1)q×n and N t ∈ R (t+1)q×(t+1)m are
To facilitate future discussion, we also denote the first left (t + 1)q by (T + 1)m submatrix of N t by N t,T , T ≤ t.
In order to proceed with differential privacy analysis, we consider a new output with noises w(t) ∈ R q : y w (t) := y(t)+ w(t). From (2), Y w,t ∈ R (t+1)q can be described as
This defines a mapping M :
In differential privacy analysis, this mapping is called a mechanism [8] , [9] . It is worth mentioning that the terminology "input" can be confusing since it is used in both the dynamical system (1) and the induced mechanism (5). Since the mapping defined by (2) depends on both the initial state x 0 and input sequence U t , the input data of the mechanism is (x 0 , U t ).
Remark 2.1: Depending on the problem, both x 0 and U t are not necessarily private. Our results can readily be extended to address the scenario where either x 0 or U t is confidential, and the other is public.
Differential privacy gives an index of the privacy level of a mechanism, which is characterized by the sensitivity of published output data Y w,t with respect to input data (x 0 , U t ). More specifically, if for a different pair of input data ((
w,t ) are very different, then one can conclude that input data is easy to estimate, i.e. the mechanism is less private. For such a reason, differential privacy is defined by using a different pair but "similar" data pair, where by similar we mean that they satisfy the following adjacency relations.
Definition 2.2:
A pair of initial states (
There are two minor differences between Definition 2.3 and the symmetric binary relation in [10] . In [10] , only one element of a pair is allowed to be different, and the norm of the signal is used; however, these differences are not essential for differential privacy analysis.
In the adjacency relations, the values c x and c u give an upper bound on the distance (or similarity) of pairs of input data sets (x 1 0 , U 1 t ) and (x 2 0 , U 2 t ). Therefore, these c x and c u are decided based on the range of input data sets, in which one wants to make the input data difficult to distinguish. Now, we are ready to define differential privacy of the mechanism.
Definition 2.4: Let ε > 0 and δ ≥ 0. Then, the mechanism (5) is said to be (ε, δ)-differentially private for Adj 
for any pairs (
, where e is Euler's number. Our definition of differential privacy is a direct extension of the original one [8] , [9] and slightly different from that defined for linear dynamical systems in [10] ; our definition depends on the initial state in addition to the input sequence, and W t is not necessarily causal. For asymptotically stable systems, the effect of the initial state becomes weaker as time progresses, but in differential privacy analysis, a system is not required to be stable. Therefore, we employ the definition depending on the initial state.
If ε and δ are large, then for a different pair of input data
, the corresponding pair of probability distributions of output data (Y 1 w,t , Y 2 w,t ) is very different, i.e., a mechanism is less private. Therefore, the privacy level of a mechanism is evaluated by the pair of variables ε and δ. From its definition, one notices that if a mechanism is (ε 1 , δ 1 )-differentially private, then it is (ε 2 , δ 2 )-differentially private for any ε 2 ≥ ε 1 and δ 2 ≥ δ 1 . Therefore, ε and δ give a lower bound on the privacy level, where larger ε and δ mean being less private.
As clear from the definition, ε and δ also depend on noise. In fact, we show that the sensitivity of the dynamical system (1) provides the lower bound on the covariance matrix for the multivariate Gaussian noise to achieve (ε, δ)-differential privacy for any given ε > 0 and 1/2 > δ > 0. For selfcontainedness, we recall the definition of the multivariate Gaussian noise. A random variable W t is said to have a non-degenerate multivariate Gaussian distribution with the mean value µ ∈ R (t+1)q and symmetric and positive definite covariance matrix Σ ∈ R (t+1)q×(t+1)q , denoted by W t ∼ N (t+1)q (µ, Σ) if its distribution has the following probability density
We also recall the so called Q-function: Q(w) :=
2 dv, where Q(w) < 1/2 for w > 0. Now, we have the following result for differential privacy with output noise as a generalization of [9] , [10, Theorem 3] .
Theorem 2.5: The mechanism (5) induced by a nondegenerate multivariate Gaussian noise 
where R(ε, δ) :
In a similar manner as [10, Theorem 3] , for arbitrary ε > 0, we have
for any (
. This inequality (8) holds if (7) is satisfied because
holds.
For any given c x , c u (τ ), ε > 0 and 1/2 > δ > 0, one can make a mechanism (ε, δ)-differentially private if one designs the covariance matrix Σ of the multivariate Gaussian noise sufficiently large such that (7) holds. One notices that the matrix O t N t only depends on the system dynamics (1) . We analyze this matrix in the next subsection.
In a special scenario when Σ = σ 2 I (t+1)q , σ > 0 (an i.i.d. Gaussian noise), we have
Still one can design the noise to make the mechanism (5) (ε, δ)-differentially private for arbitrary ε > 0 and 1/2 > δ > 0. In this case, the design parameter is only the variable σ. Remark 2.6: One can also extend [10, Theorem 2] to the i.i.d. Laplace noise to our problem setting. However, the extension to the multivariate Laplace noise is not clear because this involves the computation of the modified Bessel function of the second kind. Let w i (t), i = 1, . . . , q, t ∈ Z + be an i.i.d. Laplace noise with variance µ ∈ R and distribution b > 0. Then, the mechanism (5) is (ε, 0)-differentially private for Adj 
where |A| 1 = max j i |a i,j | is the induced matrix 1-norm of matrix A. As for the Gaussian noise case, the matrix O t N t plays a crucial role for the Laplace noise design too. ⊳ Note that in Theorem 2.5, the system (1) is not necessarily stable. Now, we focus on the asymptotically stable case. Then, one can characterize the differentially privacy level in terms of the H ∞ -norm and the observability Gramian, where the H ∞ -norm of the system (1) is a positive constant γ satisfying
and the observability Gramian is
where O t is defined in (3). It is emphasized that λ max (O T t O t ) is non-decreasing with respect to t ∈ Z + , and for the asymptotically stable system, O ∞ is finite. Now, we obtain the following result as a corollary of Theorem 2.5. If c x = 0 and the multivariate Gaussian is i.i.d, the following result reduces to [10, Corollary 1] .
Corollary 2.7: The mechanism (5) induced by an asymptotically stable system (1) and a non-degenerate multivariate Gaussian noise
at a finite time t with ε > 0 and 1/2 > δ > 0 if the covariance matrix Σ is chosen such that
Therefore, if (11) holds, (8) holds, where
Form the proof, one notices that for an asymptotically stable systems (1), if the covariance matrix Σ is chosen such that (11) holds, then (7) holds for any t ∈ Z + . Theorem 2.7 implies that for every asymptotically stable system and for any ε > 0 and 1/2 > δ > 0, there exists a non-degenerate multivariate Gaussian noise with a sufficiently large but bounded covariance matrix which makes the induced mechanism (ε, δ)-differentially private for any t ∈ Z + . However, this is not true for unstable systems, i.e., the norm of the covariance matrices in sequence increases and becomes unbounded; a similar statement can be found in [24, Theorem 4.5] .
B. Connection with Strong Input Observability
In the previous subsection, we have studied the (ε, δ)-differential privacy of a mechanism induced by output noise. However, it is not intuitively clear how private the input data is from the (ε, δ) pair and how differential privacy relates with systems' properties. In differential privacy, noise is designed in order to prevent the initial state and input sequence from being determined from the published output sequence. From the systems and control point of view, the problem of determining the initial state and input sequence can be interpreted as observability or left invertibility [12] , [13] analysis. In this subsection, we consider to study differential privacy from the input observability aspect.
First, we define strong input observability studied in this paper.
Definition 2.8: The system (1) is said to be strongly input observable if there exists T ∈ Z + such that both the initial state x 0 ∈ R n and initial input u(0) ∈ R m are uniquely determined from the measured output sequence Y T .
There are several similar but different concepts from strong input observability defined here. First, if U T is known, the analysis reduces to determining the initial state x 0 , i.e, the standard observability analysis [25] . When U T is unknown, the property that x 0 is uniquely determined is called unknowninput (or strong) observability [26] . Next, if x 0 is known, the analysis reduces to determining the initial input u(0); this property is called input observability with the known initial state x 0 [12] or left invertibility [13] . It is worth mentioning that if the initial input u(0) is uniquely determined from x 0 and Y T , then by using (x 0 , u(0)) and the system dynamics (1), x(1) can be computed. Then one can construct u(1) from x(1) and Y T +1 , and consequently the whole input sequence U t , t ∈ Z + . For such a reason, the initial input is focused; because of the same reason, strong input observability in Definition 2.8 focuses on the initial state and initial input (x 0 , u(0)). Finally, for unknown initial state x 0 , the property that the initial input u(0) is uniquely determined is called input observability [12] . Therefore, our strong input observability requires both unknown-input (or strong) observability and input observability. However, to the best of our knowledge, the property uniquely determining both of the initial state and initial input (x 0 , u(0)) has not been defined previously in the literature.
The results in the existing observability analysis are helpful for the strong input observability analysis. Especially, by extending [13, Theorem 3], we have the following necessary and sufficient condition for strong input observability. Since the proof is similar, it is omitted. Theorem 2.9: The system (1) is strongly input observable if and only if
for O t in (3) and the submatrix N t,T of N t in (4), i.e., the matrix O 2n N 2n,n has the column full rank. ⊳ This rank condition (12) implies that a system is strongly input observable if and only if (x 0 , U n ) is uniquely determined from Y 2n irrespective of the choice of the input subsequence [u(n + 1); · · · ; u(2n)]. Following similar discussion as the input observability with known initial state above, one notices that if (x 0 , U n ) is uniquely determined from Y 2n , then (x 0 , U n+t ) is uniquely determined from Y 2n+t for arbitrary t ∈ Z + . Also, from the structures of O t and N t,T , if O 2n N 2n,n has the column full rank, then
for any t ∈ Z + . Conversely, from the Cayley-Hamilton theorem [27] , if O 2n+t N 2n+t,n has the column full rank for some t ∈ Z + , then (12) holds. Therefore, we have the following corollary of Theorem 2.9.
Corollary 2.10:
The system (1) is strongly input observable if and only if
for any integers T ≥ n and t ≥ T + n. ⊳ This rank condition (14) is a qualitative criterion for strong input observability, but differential privacy is a quantitative criterion. A connection between these two concepts can be established by extending the concept of the observability Gramian to strong input observability because controllability and observability Gramians give both quantitative and qualitative criteria. To extend the concept of the Gramian, we consider a wighted least square estimation problem of the initial state x 0 and input sequences U T , T ≥ n from the output sequence with the measurement noise Y w,t , t ≥ T + n under a technical assumption u(τ ) = 0, T < τ ≤ t:
This problem has a unique solution if (14) holds, i.e., a system is strongly input observable, and the solution is
If there is no measurement noise, i.e., W T = 0, then (16) gives the actual initial state and input sequence. The matrix in (16) ,
characterizes the differential privacy level of a mechanism, which we state as a corollary of Theorem 2.5. Corollary 2.11: Let T ≥ n and t ≥ T + n. Then, the mechanism (5) induced by a non-degenerate multivariate Gaussian noise
, T < τ ≤ t at a finite time t with ε > 0 and 1/2 > δ > 0, if the covariance matrix Σ is chosen such that
holds. ⊳ Notice that if T = t, (18) is equivalent to (7) . From (18), Corollary 2.11 concludes that differential privacy is characterized by the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix O Σ,t,T , where O Σ,t,T is not necessarily non-singular in differential privacy analysis; non-singularity is required in order to guarantee the uniqueness of a solution to the least square estimation problem (15) . The matrix O Σ,t,T has a strong connection with the observability Gramian (10) that is also induced by the least square estimation problem of the initial state x 0 (note that the controllability Gramian is originally obtained from the minimum energy control problem [28] , the dual of the least square estimation problem of the initial state).
For Σ = I (t+1)q we call O t,T := O I (t+1)q ,t,T the strong input observability Gramian because this gives a similar observation as the observability Gramian. That is, the strong input observability Gramian is both a qualitative and quantitative criterion for strong input observability. For instance, from Corollary 2.10, the system (1) is strongly input observable if and only if O t,T is non-singular for any integers T ≥ n and t ≥ n + T . Also, from (16) , if all eigenvalues of O t,T is large, then J (x0,UT ) in (16) with Σ = I (t+1)q is small. That is, (x 0 , U T ) is relatively easy to be estimated. This observation agrees with (18) because for Σ = σ 2 I (t+1)q , large σ is required if λ max (O t,T ) is large; recall that the discussion after (9) .
To gain deeper insight with respect to the privacy analysis, we take a further look at the eigenvalues of the strong input observability Gramian O t,T from three aspects. First, from (3), (4) and (17) with
where
is the standard observability Gramian for the initial state x 0 , and (O t,T ) i+1,i+1 can be viewed as the observability Gramian corresponding to the initial input u(0), which we call the initial input observability Gramian. From the relation between the eigenvalues and the trace, the sum of the eigenvalues of O t,T is the sum of the eigenvalues of all (O t,T ) i,i , i = 1, . . . , T + 1. Therefore, if the standard and initial input observability Gramians have large eigenvalues, the strong input observability Gramian O t,T has large eigenvalues also. In other words, the privacy level of the initial state and whole input sequence is characterized by that of only the initial state and initial input. This fact is natural, since the output at each time instant contains the information of the initial state and initial input, i.e. these are the least private information, and since if the initial state and initial input is uniquely determined, the whole input sequence are uniquely determined.
Next, for fixed t, the minimum eigenvalue of O t,T does not increase with respect to T . For instance,
Recall that these two Gramians are obtained from the least square estimation problems when u(t) = 0 for t = 2, 3, . . . and t = 1, 2, . . . , respectively. Therefore, (19) corresponds to a natural observation that u(0) is more difficult to estimate if u(1) is unknown compared to the case when u(1) is known to be 0. Finally, for fixed T , λ max (O t,T ) is non-decreasing with respect to t, and thus ε in Corollary 2.11 is non-decreasing with respect to t. This implies that as more data are being collected, less private a mechanism becomes. It is worth emphasizing that this observation is obtained when Σ = I (t+1)q , or more generally Σ = σ 2 I (t+1)q , σ > 0, i.e., output noise is i.i.d. Therefore, by employing non-i.i.d. noise, it is still possible to keep the same privacy level along with longer duration; we will discuss this later.
The above discussions are based on the minimum or maximum eigenvalue of the strong input observability Gramian. For more detailed privacy (strong input observability) analysis, each eigenvalue and the associated eigen-space can be used as typically done for the standard observability Gramian (10) . Let
is relatively easy to observe. Especially, if 0 < λ k+1 , then such (x 0 , U T ) can be uniquely determined, and the projection of span{v k+1 , . . . , v T } onto the (x 0 , u(0))-space gives the strongly input observable subspace. For the (non-strong) input observability with known initial state (i.e., left invertibility), the input observable and unobservable subspaces have been studied based on an extension of Kalman's canonical decomposition [29] , but quantitative analysis has not been established yet.
The quantitative analysis of subspaces can be used for designing noise to make a system more private. Let λ k ≪ λ k+1 , and consider the projection of span{v k+1 , . . . , v T } onto the (x 0 , u(0))-space, which we denote by X ×U ⊂ R m . Then, the output of the system is sensitive for the initial states and inputs in X ×U. In other words, such initial states and inputs are less private. In order to protect less private input information, one can directly add noise v ∈ X × U to the initial state and the input channel instead of the output channel. This motivates us studying differential privacy with input noise.
C. Differential Privacy With Input Noise
In the previous subsection, we mention the idea of adding noise to the input channel. If one adds noise to the input channel, the privacy level of the input data is intuitively more natural rather than adding noise to the output channel. In contrast, the utility of output data is not intuitively clear. Furthermore, differential privacy analysis is technically more involved because of the computation of the probability distribution function P; the main difficulty is that the output variables are not necessarily non-degenerate (while they are Gaussian with a symmetric and positive semi-definite covariance matrix if the input noise is Gaussian), and thus it is not always easy to find a suitable change of variables for the computation of the probability. In order to address this issue, even though artificial, some technical procedures are required when we study differential privacy of a mechanism designed by input noise; essentially, our procedure in this section is equivalent to selecting a different base measure using the disintegration theorem.
In order to proceed with analysis, we assume that the system (1) is strongly input observable. This assumption implies that we address a less private scenario because the initial state and initial input can be uniquely determined from the output sequence if one does not add noise. Under the strong input observability assumption, (14) holds for any T ≥ n and t ≥ T + n, i.e. the matrix in (14) has the column full rank, which implicitly implies (t + T + 1)q ≥ n + (t + 1)m. Then, there exists a (t + T + 1)q − (n + (t + 1)m) by (t + T + 1)q matrix N t,T such that
Next, we introduce dummy variables V d,t,T ∈ R (t+T +1)q−(n+(t+1)m) . The reason we call them the dummy variables is that V d,t,T does not affect the differential privacy level.
Remark 2.12: If a system is strongly input unobservable, i.e., (14) does not hold, then by using the singular value decomposition of O t N t,T , one can proceed with similar analysis. ⊳ Now, we consider the following system with the initial state, input and output noises, where the output noise v d is generated by the dummy variables,
By recalling the symbol of a sequence in the notation part of the Introduction, define
From (20) and (24), for v(τ ) = 0, τ > T , the output sequence Y v,t ∈ R (t+1)q can be described by
We study the connection between the differential privacy levels of mechanisms (5) and (25) . The important fact is that the numbers of the elements of W t and V t are the same, and from (20) , N t is non-singular. For mechanisms (5) and (25) , the generated output sequences are the same if and only if W t = N t V t . Therefore, the designs of the noises W t and V t are equivalent problems. In the previous subsection, we have studied differential privacy of the mechanism (5). For the mechanism (25), we have the following corollary of Theorem 2.5. Corollary 2.13: Let T ≥ n and t ≥ T + n. Also let V t ∼ N (t+1)q (µ, Σ), Σ = diag{Σ 1 , Σ 2 } be a non-degenerate multivariate Gaussian noise, where
is the covariance matrix of the initial state and input noise [v x ; V t ], and Σ 2 is that of the dummy variable V d,t,T . Then, the mechanism (25) induced by the strongly input observable system (1) and V t is ε-differentially private for Adj
Proof: Instead of (7), one has
From (20) and (21), we have
Therefore
As mentioned above, the differential privacy level only depends on the covariance Σ 1 of the input noise [v x ; V T ], i.e., the differential privacy level does not depend on the system. The covariance Σ 1 gives an intuitive interpretation of the privacy level of the input. Therefore, Corollary 2.11 can help understanding the interpretation of values (ε, δ) from the perspective of the privacy level of the input.
In Corollary 2.11 and Theorem 2.13, the differential privacy levels of both mechanisms are the same if
where we recall (17) for the first equality; the converse is not true in general since differential privacy only evaluates the maximum eigenvalues. Therefore, adding the Gaussian noise with the covariance Σ to the output of the system (1) is equivalent to adding the the Gaussian noise with the covariance O −1 Σ,t,T to the input of the system (1) under the strong input observability assumption.
In Section II-B, we mentioned that the privacy level of the mechanism (5) with i.i.d. output noise Σ = σI (t+1)q decreases with the growth of duration. In contrast, if one adds noise to the initial state and input channel, the privacy level of a mechanism does not depend on the duration because one can directly decide the distribution of the estimated initial state and input sequence. These two facts do not contradict each other if one allows to add non-i.i.d output noise. From (27) adding suitable non-i.i.d. noise to the output channel has a similar effect as adding noise to the initial state and input channel. Therefore, adding non-i.i.d. noise is a key factor for keeping the same privacy level against the duration when one adds noise to the output channel.
The reason that the dummy variables V d,t,T do not affect the differential privacy level can be explained based on the least square estimation problems of the input sequence. For a strongly input observable system, the solution to the following least square estimation problem
is, from (14), (21), and (25),
The least square estimation is the actual initial state and input sequence plus the noise added to them. Because of the condition (21), the dummy variable V d,t,T is canceled. This is the reason that the dummy variable does not affect differential privacy analysis.
III. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE CONTROLLER DESIGNS

A. Motivation and Problem Setting
Consider the following plant
where x p (t) ∈ R np , u p (t) ∈ R mp and y p (t) ∈ R qp denote the state, input and output, respectively, and A p ∈ R np×np , B p ∈ R np×mp , C p ∈ R qp×np and D p ∈ R qp×mp . In this section, we consider to design an output feedback controller, which achieves y p → y r as t → ∞ for a given reference output y r (t) ∈ R qp protecting private information. A possible application is a smart grid in the Introduction. Another is a health care system; the outputs y p can be the status of a patient that needs to be private, and y r can be the average status of healthy people that is a piece of public information. Based on the health conditions of a patient, a medical doctor conducts medical treatments, which can be viewed as the control inputs u p , and a third person may access the information of the medical treatments. From the medical treatments, even when it is difficult to conceal whether a patient suffers from a disease, it is still possible to protect the information on the stage of the disease.
More generally, we consider the following scenario; also see Fig. 1.   1 ) the reference output y r and the control input u p (or with noise u p + w) are public; 2) the dynamics of designed controller can be public; 3) the output of the plant y p needs to be private; 4) one who designs a controller knows the parameters of the plant, namely (A p , B p , C p , D p ) matrices, but this is private for the third person.
In the health system example, these assumptions correspond to the following scenario. The third person may access the information of the actual performed medical treatments (u p ), but we want to avoid the situation where the health condition of the patient (y p ) is being estimated. This can also yields the situation that the health parameters of the patient ((A p , B p , C p , D p )-matrices) is being identified from the input and output data. As typically done for differential privacy analysis, we address this kind of problem under less private scenario when the third person can access the information of the applied method of the medical treatments (controller dynamics). In the following subsections, first we summarize the standard result for the tracking controller design based on the internal model principle, which are more generally referred to as the output regulation problem [16] . Then, we address the privacy issue based on our observation for differential privacy in the previous section in order to protect the information of y p from u p even if a third person obtains the controller dynamics. That is, we consider to add noise to the designed output regulation controller in order to protect the private information. Finally, we shift our ground and consider to identify the information of y p from the state space model of the controller and published u p . This is also an important problem from privacy preserving viewpoints because one may have observations for making the estimation problem more difficult, i.e. for protecting private information further.
B. Tracking Problems
Suppose that the reference output y r (t) is generated by the following exosystem:
where x r (t) ∈ R nr and y r (t) ∈ R qr ; A r ∈ R nr×nr and C r ∈ R qr×nr . Then, the composite system consisting of the plant (28) and exosystem (29) is
Our control objective is lim t→∞ e(t) = 0, which is called a linear output regulation problem [16] . As an output feedback controller, the following observer based stabilizing controller is typically used
T ∈ R (np+nr )×qp , L 1 ∈ R np×qp are design parameters. The output regulation problem is solvable by the above dynamic output feedback controller under the following standard assumptions [16] . 
have a pair of solutions X ∈ R np×nr and U ∈ R mp×nr . ⊳ Assumption 3.4 guarantees that for any given x r (t) generated by (29) , there exist x p,s (t) and u p,s (t) simultaneously satisfying (28) and e(t) = y p (t)−y r (t) = 0 for all t ∈ Z + , i.e., that lim t→∞ e(t) = 0 is feasible. Assumption 3.1 guarantees such x p,s (t) and u p,s (t) uniquely exist; this assumption is just for the ease of discussion and is not necessarily to be imposed as mentioned in [16] . Under Assumption 3.4, the output regulation problem is solvable if the closed-loop system consisting of the plant (28) and the controller (31) 
asymptotically stable, respectively. Then, G 2 can be designed as
for U and X in Assumption 3.4. This designed dynamic output feedback controller solves the linear output regulation problem indeed. However, in order to implement the differentially private controller, slight modification is required for the controller dynamics, which is discussed in the next subsection.
C. Impossibility of Differentially Private Controller Design
In order to prevent the information of y p from being identified from published u p , we exploit the idea of differential privacy, i.e., adding noise. In our problem, the system (1) studied in the previous section is the controller dynamics (31) . One notices that there are flexibilities for the controller dynamics, since parameters G 1 and L are arbitrary matrices satisfying stabilization requirements. Our goal is to propose a method of destining G 1 and L based on the concept of differential privacy. Then, for the designed controller, we add noise to achieve the preferable differential privacy level. It is worth mentioning that the terminologies of output and input noises can be confusing since the output of the controller is the input of the plant. Throughout this section, we use output (resp. input) noise to indicate the noise for the output u p (resp. input y p ) of the controller, since our target dynamics are the controller dynamics.
Remark 3.5: One may think that if a strongly input unobservable controller is designed, the information in the strongly input unobservable space is protected without adding noise as mentioned in Section II-B. However, from Theorem 2.9, this reduces to a rank constraint problem that is difficult to solve in general as the rank minimization problem is known to be NP-hard [30] . ⊳ First, we consider to add output noise as in the left of Fig. 1 . As mentioned in the previous section, by adding sufficiently large noise w, one can always achieve the prescribed privacy level. However, large noise can change a control input significantly, and the designed controller may not work for the output regulation problem very well. Therefore, it is desirable to design a controller which becomes highly private by adding small noise. Such a class of controllers is characterized by our observation, in particular Theorem 2.7. According to this theorem, if the H ∞ -norm of the transfer function of the controller is sufficiently small, then small noise is enough to achieve (ε, δ)-private for given ε > 0 and δ ≥ 0. Therefore, we consider to design a controller with a small H ∞ -norm. Note that in Theorem 2.7, the differential privacy level also depends on the standard observability Gramian of the initial state. However, it is not straightforward to simultaneously specify the maximum eigenvalues of the observability Gramian and H ∞ -norm. In fact, it is known that the maximum Hankel singular value, the square root of the maximum eigenvalue of the product of the controllability and observability Gramians is bounded by the H ∞ -norm [31] . Therefore, making H ∞ -norm small can result in making the maximum eigenvalue of the observability Gramian small. Remark 3.6: Even if one considers different noise than the Gaussian noise such as the Laplace noise as in Remark 2.6, making H ∞ -norm small can increase the differential privacy level. Making H ∞ -norm small can result in making λ
small. Then, from the equivalence of the norm, any matrix induced norm of [ O t N t ] becomes small. Therefore, from Remark 2.6, the differential privacy level increases also for the Laplace noise. ⊳ In summary, in order to solve the output regulation problem and at the same time protect the information of the input of the controller y p , a simple way is designing a controller having a small H ∞ -norm, which implies that the designed controller needs to be asymptotically stable in general. Unfortunately, stable controller design is not always possible because of its structure in (31) . Proof: By using Assumption 3.4 and (31) , compute
If D p = 0, this becomes zero when λ is an eigenvalue of A r . Therefore, any eigenvalue of A r of the pair
is not observable. Therefore, the set of eigenvalues of A c contains that of A r . Moreover, any eigenvalue of A r is marginally stable according to Assumption 3.1. If D p = 0, one can use the output regulation controller (31) addressing the privacy requirement. However, there are plenty of systems for which D p = 0. In order to deal with these systems, we need to modify the output regulation controller (31), which is done in the next subsection.
D. Differentially Private Controller Design Methods with Output Noise
In order to address the case D p = 0, we consider to construct a reduced controller based on a reduced order observer. That is, we consider to design the following controller dynamics with output noise:
where w(t) ∈ R mp is the output noise of the controller. The difference from the previous controller (31) is to use the actual state x r of the exosystem (29) instead of the estimated onex r . However, the number of design parameters is the same; these parameters are G 1 , L 1 , and w, where we consider L 1 instead of L differently from the previous subsection.
Remark 3.8: Since we consider a scenario where the information of the exosystem (29) is public, one can use the information of x r . However, depending on the situation, only the output y r and the state space equation are available. In such a case, one can design an observer for the exosystem; this is possible under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 because they imply observability of the exosystem. Note that the observer does not use any information of the plant or controller, and thus using the observer does not affect the privacy level of the controller (34) . ⊳ Based on the discussion in the previous subsection, in order to design a highly differentially private controller with small noise, we require the following three for the new controller parameters G 1 and
3) The H ∞ -norm of the transfer function matrix of the controller (34) from y p to u p is bounded by given γ > 0, i.e.,
The first two conditions guarantees that the controller (34) solves the output regulation problem. The third condition is for the privacy requirement. Note that these three requirements do not mention the property of the following closed-loop system:
,
It is preferable that y p is less sensitive with respect to w, i.e., the H ∞ -norm of the closed-loop system from w to y p is small. We also address this requirement.
Remark 3.9:
As mentioned in Section II-A, differential privacy analysis itself is possible for the unstable controller based on Theorem 2.5. However, this theorem does not give a clear indication on how to choose design parameters G 1 and L 1 . Therefore, we consider to design an asymptotically stable controller. ⊳ Stabilization of the plant (34) by a stable controller is called strong stabilization. A necessary and sufficient condition for strong stabilizability is described in terms of a parity interlacing property (PIP) of the transfer function matrix [32] , and Assumptions 3.2 and 3.3 are only necessary conditions in general because these two assumptions grantee the stability of the closed-loop system only. However, the PIP condition does not provide a controller design method. For continuous-time systems, the papers [33] , [34] provide ways of designing controller satisfying Condition 3) based on the LMI. We employ one of these methods in order to achieve our objectives.
It is not easy to simultaneously finding G 1 and L 1 satisfying all three conditions; the reason will be explained later. Therefore, first, we find G 1 stabilizing A p + B p G 1 , which can be done by multiple methods under Assumption 3.2. Then, we consider to find L 1 satisfying 2) and 3) as follows.
Lemma 3.10: Suppose that G is chosen such that A p + B p G 1 is asymptotically stable. If there exist P ∈ R np×np andL 1 ∈ R np×qp satisfying the following LMIs:
and
then A p + L 1 C p with L 1 := P −1L 1 is asymptotically stable, and (35) holds. Moreover, if there exist Q ∈ R np×np and γ > 0 satisfying the following LMI:
where * are suitable elements to make the matrix symmetric, then the H ∞ -norm of the closed-loop system (36) from w to y p is less thanγ. Proof: If (37) holds, (35) holds [35, Theorem 4.6.6] . Next, (38) implies that A p + L 1 C p is asymptotically stable. The last statements also follows from [35, Theorem 4.6.6] .
At least for any given G 1 stabilizing A p + B p G 1 , it is possible to determine if there exist P ,L 1 γ > 0 satisfying the conditions in the above theorem by replacing (37) with
This condition (40) itself is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable controller (31) when G is given. For a given G, if the LMIs (38) and (40) do not have solutions, then the LMIs (37) and (38) do not have solutions for any γ > 0. Conversely, if the LMIs (38) and (40) have solutions P andL, then strong stabilization is doable. Each stable system has a bounded H ∞ -norm, which can be used to estimate an upper bound of γ in (37) . An alternative way of controller design is findingL 1 satisfying 2) first, and then one can use similar LMIs for finding G 1 that satisfies 1) and 3) simultaneously. If one tries to find G 1 andL 1 at the same time, then one encounters BMIs, e.g. there is a cross term of G 1 and P or G 1 andL 1 in P 13 in (37) . BMIs are more difficult to handle than LMIs, since a BMI describes those sets that are not necessary convex.
Next, for designing output noise w, one can use Theorem 2.5 or Corollary 2.7 in order to achieve a desired (ε, δ)-differentially private level. Indeed, by combining Corollary 2.7 and Lemma 3.10, we obtain the following theorem. Since the proof directly follows, it is omitted. Theorem 3.11: Under Assumptions 3.1-3.4, suppose that G 1 is chosen such that A p + B p G 1 is asymptotically stable. If there exist γ > 0, P ∈ R np×np andL ∈ R np×qp satisfying the LMIs (37) and (38) , then the mechanism induced by the controller dynamics (34) and a non-degenerate multivariate Gaussian noise W t ∼ N (t+1)mp (µ, Σ) is (ε, δ)-differentially private for Adj , −L 1 , G 1 , 0) . ⊳ In summary, the differentially private controller is designed as follows. First, one design the controller dynamics (34) based on the LMIs (37) and (38) (or additionally the LMI (39)) and then the noise w based on the above theorem. In the LMIs (37) and (38) , the design parameters reduce to γ, the H ∞ -norm of the controller (34) (or additionallyγ of the LMI (39)). From the privacy aspect, a small γ is preferable, but making γ small may result in deterioration of the control performance. Moreover, adding noise w may result in deterioration of the control performance also. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the control performance and the privacy level for the differentially private controller design.
E. Differentially Private Controller Design Methods with Input Noise
Another way of differentially private controller design is adding noise to the input channel of the controller (i.e. the output channel of the plant) as in the right of Fig. 1 ; one should not add the output noise generated by the dummy variables, since this dummy output noise does not affect the differential privacy level. In the input noise case, it is more intuitively clear how private information y p is protected from published u p even though adding noise to the output channel and input channel are essentially the same by choosing suitable covariance matrices as mentioned in Section II-C. In this subsection, we briefly mention the differentially private controller design with input noise.
A potential application of adding noise to the input channel of the controller is the cloud based control [36] , [37] . In the cloud based control, the information of parameters (A p , B p , C p , D p ) and output y p of the plant is uploaded to the cloud computing system. Then, one receives the control input u p from the cloud system. In this scenario, one may add noise v to y p in order to protect the information of the plant before uploading the plant data.
Therefore, it is preferable that the designed control input u p is less sensitive with respect to the noise v. As for the output noise case, this is achieved by minimizing the H ∞ -norm of the controller (35) , and thus the LMIs (37) and (38) are again helpful. Moreover, it is also preferable that the output y p of the closed-loop system is less sensitive with respect to noise v. Since the transfer function matrices of the closed-loop system from input noise v to y p is different from that from output noise w to y p , one needs to use a different LMI than (39) . Indeed, the following LMI is needed to be taken into account:
where * are suitable elements to make the matrix symmetric.
F. Private Data Estimation
In this subsection, we shift our ground and consider to estimate y p (t) from the published u p (t) and the controller dynamics (31) . As already mentioned for a strongly input observable controller, the input of the controller y p (t) can be uniquely determined. However, our differentially private controllers are designed by adding noise, and one needs to estimate y p (t) under noise. One may still use the least square estimation (15) , but the assumption u(τ ) = 0, T < τ ≤ t is required. In contrast to the input estimation, for the state estimation, one can use the standard techniques of the optimal linear filters or smoothers. Therefore, we consider to reformulate the input estimation problem as a state estimation problem inspired by the unknown input observer design [38] , [39] . Then one can employ optimal linear filters or smoothers for the input estimation.
Suppose that the designed controller (34) is strongly input observable for the output u p and input y p , where x r is public. Recall the symbols for sequences U p,2n (t) and Y p,2n (t) in the notation part of the Introduction. In a similar manner as (2), the output sequence U p,t of the controller can be described as (42) where A =Ā c , B = −L 1 , C = G 1 , and D = 0 for O 2n and N 2n , and N r,t denotes
From (12) , there exist a (not necessarily unique) matrix K ∈ R (n+(n+1)m)×(2n+1)q such that
By using this K, define
Then, from (42),
By substituting them into (34), we have
This system corresponds to a left inverse system of the controller if one view the input and output of this model as U p,2n and y p in (45) , respectively, where recall that the state of exosystem x r is a piece of public information. In order to estimate the input y p of the differentially private controller from the published output U p,2n of the controller, one can consider the state estimation problem of this model (46) with the process and measurement noisesṽ(t) ∈ R (2n+1)mp and w(t) ∈ R mp .
Letx c (t) be the state estimation of (46) . Then, definẽ
Finally from (45) andŨ p,2n (t), the estimation of y p (t) denoted byỹ p (t) can be computed as
It is worth mentioning that in (46) , future information of u p (t), namely U p,2n (t) is used in order to estimate y p (t). In other words, at time t, one can estimate the historic data y p (t − 2n) that needs to be private, and thus the private data estimation can be formulated as a smoothing problem. There are several techniques for designing filters or smoothers such as the Kalman filter or Kalman smoother, and one of them can be employed for the state estimation. Typically, for the filtering and smoothing problems, i.i.d. Gaussian noises are used as the process and measurement noises. Therefore, adding non-i.i.d. or non-Gaussian noises to the differentially private controller could be useful for protecting the private data than adding i.i.d. Gaussian noises.
G. Example
We study a control problem of the diabetes mellifluous. The zero-order-hold discretization of a model in [40] with the sampling period 1min is given by
where x p,1 (t) = G(t) − G 0 and x p,2 (t) = H(t) − H 0 for the level of blood glucose G(t), the net hormone level in the blood H(t), and the constant fasting values of glucose G 0 and net hormone level H 0 , respectively. The control input u(t) accounts for the rate of infusion of exogenous hormone. The initial states and output reference are given [40] as follows:
where the initial state x p (0) of the patient is needed to be private as well as (A p , B p , C p , D p ), and the average status y ref of the healthy people is public. We consider to design a differentially private tracking controller based on the procedure in Section III-D, where Assumptions 3.1-3.4 hold for
First, we design G stabilizing A p + B p G. In [40] , a stabilizing state feedback is designed based on the optimal control problem. Here, we also design G based on the following optimal control problem: Second, the LMIs (37) and (38) have solutions P and
T . Also, the maximum eigenvalue of the observability Gramian of the controller satisfies
Moreover, the H ∞ -norm of the closed-loop system (36) from w to y p isγ = 4.0. It is difficult to make it smaller due to the requirement for the controller.
Finally, we consider to deign output noise to the differentially private controller. To this end, we fix four parameters c x > 0, c u > 0, ε > 0 and δ > 0. For instance, we tentatively choose c x = 1 and t τ =0 c u (τ ) = 1 for a given simulation time t. The parameters ε and δ are chosen as ε = 0.1 and δ = 0.0228, then Q −1 (δ) ≤ 0.2. By substituting these parameters into (11), we have
As a simple case, we consider to add i.i.d. noise, i.e., Σ = σ 2 I, and thus we chose σ = 5 such that (49) holds. Figure 2 shows the outputs y p of the plant (48) and the control inputs u p generated by the differentially private . Recall that only u p is published, and y p is private. In this simulation, the tracking control performance is less sensitive with respect to noise.
Next, we consider to estimate the output y p of the plant from the published u p by using the Kalman filter. Our designed controller satisfies (12) and thus is strongly left invertible. Then, the output of the plant y p is uniquely determined from the control input u p if there is no noise. Since noise w is added to y p , its estimation is different from the actual one. In this case, one can construct an estimator of y p based on the method in Section III-F, where we chooseṽ ∼ N (I 5 ) and w ∼ N (0, 5
2 ). The estimated y p are shown in Fig. 3 . If there is no noise, the estimated outputs are similar to the actual y p . However, if there is noise, it is difficult to estimate the actual y p even by using the Kalman filter. Since the differentially private controller has the small H ∞ -norm from w to y p , the output y p of its left inverse is very sensitive with respect to noise w. This makes filter design difficult.
IV. REMARKS ON NONLINEAR DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE MECHANISMS
We consider to extend some of our results to the nonlinear mechanisms toward the differentially private controller design. The output regulation and H ∞ -norm analysis are extended to nonlinear systems at least locally; see e.g. [16] , [41] . It is mentioned in [16] that under the nonlinear counterparts of Assumptions 3.1-3.4, a dynamic output feedback controller solving the local output regulation problem exists; especially if the linearization of the closed-loop system is asymptotically stable, the output feedback controller solves the local output regulation problem. Moreover, if the linearization of the controller satisfies the requirements 1) -3) in Section III-D, then the controller satisfies the requirements locally also; see e.g. the connection of the H ∞ norm of the nonlinear system and its linearization [41] . Therefore, if differential privacy analysis is extended to the mechanisms induced by nonlinear dynamical systems, one can design a differentially private controller for the nonlinear mechanisms at least locally in a similar manner as the linear case. In this section, we proceed with differential privacy analysis of the mechanism induced by a nonlinear dynamical system and the output Gaussian noise. For nonlinear dynamical systems, even if Gaussian noise is added to the input channel, the output variable is not Gaussian in general, and thus we do not analyze the mechanisms induced by the input noise.
A. Differential Privacy with Output Noise
Consider the following nonlinear discrete-time control systems
Its solution x(t) starting from x 0 controlled by U t−1 is denoted by φ(t, x 0 , U t−1 ), where φ(0, x 0 , U −1 ) := x 0 . For instance, φ(1, x 0 , U 0 ) = f (x 0 , u(0)) and φ(2, x 0 , U 1 ) = f (f (x 0 , u(0)), u(1)).
We add noise w(t) ∈ R q to the output channel,
Then, the output sequence Y w,t can be described by
Now, we are ready to obtain an extension of Theorem 2.5 to the nonlinear mechanisms by using input data dependent Gaussian noise. Theorem 4.1: The mechanism (52) induced by a non-degenerate multivariate Gaussian noise
for any x 0 ∈ R n and U t ∈ R (t+1)m . Proof: In a similar manner as for Theorem 2.5, one obtains (8) for
respectively. For (55), we have H t (x 0 +x 0 , U t +Ū t ) − H t (x 0 , U t ) 1 ε(x 0 , U t )
for any (x 0 , U t ) ∈ R n ×R (t+1)m instead of (54). Furthermore, suppose that f and h are continuously differentiable, and let γ(s) = x 0 + s(x 0 − x 0 ) and ν(s) = U t + s(Ū t − U t ) for s ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
∂(x 0 , U t )
c u (τ ) , U t ) . This matrix has a strong connection with the local strong input observability of the nonlinear system (50); the concept of strong observability can be extended to nonlinear systems as done for local observability [42] based on the distinguishability of a pair of initial states and initial inputs. In fact, one can derive a necessary and sufficient condition for local strong input observability in terms of the differential one-forms corresponding to ∂H t (x 0 , U t )/∂(x 0 , U t ) as follows: there exists t ∈ Z + such that span{dH t (x 0 , U t )} ∩ span{dx, du 0 } = span{dx, du 0 } under the constant dimensional assumption for all (x 0 , U t ) ∈ R n × R (t+1)q ; see e.g. [42] for similar discussions for local observability. This is an extension of the condition (43) . In contrast to the qualitative criterion for strong input observability, it is still not straightforward to extend the concept of Gramians, both a qualitative and quantitative criterion. In fact, there is no clear extension of Gramians to nonlinear systems even for controllability and observability although the concept of controllability and observability and their corresponding energy functions have been extended [42] , [43] . ⊳
B. Further Analysis for Incrementally Input-to-Output Stable Systems
In Section II-A, we mention that the H ∞ -norm gives an upper bound of the differential privacy level. This observation is helpful for differentially private controller design. In this subsection, we consider to extend this result to the nonlinear case based on the concept of the incremental input-to-output stability (IOS).
For a nonlinear system, there are several ways of defining its gain or called estimation; e.g. see [44] . Especially, L 2 → L 2 estimation is extended to nonlinear systems as input-tostate stability (ISS) [44] that is also extended to incremental properties by [45] . Incremental ISS can be readily extended to input-to-output operators, discrete-time systems, and arbitrary L p → L p estimations as follows. In Appendix, we give its Lyapunov characterization.
Definition 4.4:
A nonlinear system (50) is said to be incrementally IOS (with respect to the p-norm) if the output h(φ(t, x 0 , U t−1 ), u(t)) exists for all t ∈ Z + , for any x 0 ∈ R n and u : Z + → R m , and there exist class K functions α and γ such that In the linear case, as shown in Corollary 2.7, the H ∞ -norm can be used for designing the Gaussian noise. Now, we obtain an extension of Corollary 2.7 to the nonlinear IOS system based on Theorem 4.1. The proof directly follows, and thus is omitted.
Corollary 4.5: Let W t ∼ N (t+1)q (µ(x 0 , U t ), Σ(x 0 , U t )) be a non-degenerate multivariate Gaussian noise. Then, the mechanism (52) induced by an incrementally IOS nonlinear system (50) (with respect to 2-norm) is (ε, δ)-differentially private for any Adj 
for any x 0 ∈ R n and U t ∈ R (t+1)m . ⊳ In fact, α and γ are not necessarily class K functions for differential privacy analysis, and non-negative functions are enough, but in order to connect differential privacy analysis with the well known control concepts, ISS, we consider class K functions. On the other hands, in (58), one notices that if ε and δ are constants then the covariance matrix Σ can be chosen as a constant.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied differential privacy of the mechanism induced by the discrete-time linear systems and multivariate Gaussian noise. First, we have analyzed differential privacy in terms of strong input observability and then have clarified that the differential privacy level is characterized by the maximum eigenvalue of the input observability Gramian. Moreover, we have shown that the mechanisms induced by input and output noises have the same differentially privacy level for suitable covariance matrices. Next, we have developed a differentially private dynamic controller design method, which can be highly private by adding small noise. Finally, we have briefly mentioned differential privacy analysis of incrementally IOS nonlinear systems. In general, noise and model error make analysis and controller design difficult and deteriorate the control performance, and thus they are regarded as troubles. However, they increase the privacy level. Therefore, the privacy analysis reduces to the trade-off between these factors.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we provide a sufficient condition for incremental IOS.
Theorem A: A nonlinear system (50) is incrementally IOS if there exist a continuous function V : R n × R n → R + , constants c 1 > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1), class K functions σ 1 , σ 2 , and a class K ∞ function α 2 such that ) ∈ R n × R n and (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ R m × R m . Proof: By recursively using inequality (61) for τ ≥ 1, we have
